GENOVESE, Judge.
Defendant, Kenneth Paul Daigle, appeals the trial court's grant of a motion for partial summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff, Kimberly Crittenden Daigle. Ms. Daigle has answered the appeal, seeking damages for frivolous appeal. For the following reasons, we reverse the trial court's grant of the partial summary judgment and we deny Ms. Daigle's request for damages for frivolous appeal.
Plaintiff and Defendant were married on April 2, 1994. On October 22, 2002, they jointly filed a Petition for Approval of Matrimonial Regime of Separation of Property in the Sixteenth Judicial District Court (16th JDC), Iberia Parish. Concomitant with their petition, on October 22, 2002, the parties entered into a Partition of Community Property Agreement, hereinafter referred to as the "Partition Judgment", and a judgment approving the Contract for Separation of Property Regime
On June 1, 2005, Ms. Daigle initiated separate proceedings in the Fifteenth Judicial District Court (15th JDC), Lafayette Parish, by filing a Petition for Monies Due, Damages, and for Physical Possession of Property against Mr. Daigle and his employer at that time, Merrill Lynch.
On February 15, 2011, Ms. Daigle filed a Second Supplemental and Amended Petition for Enforcement of Contract or Separation of Property and Partition Agreement, Qualified Domestic Relations Order, Legal Interest, and Attorney's Fees in the 15th JDC. After Mr. Daigle answered this petition, Ms. Daigle filed a motion for partial summary judgment, asserting that pursuant to the terms of the Partition Judgment of October 22, 2002, she was entitled to "a money judgment in her favor and against Kenneth Paul Daigle ... in the amount of one million five hundred thousand dollars ($1,500,000.00), plus legal interest, attorneys' fees and costs." The trial court granted Ms. Daigle's motion for partial summary judgment and signed a judgment consistent therewith on May 31, 2012. Mr. Daigle has appealed this judgment, and Ms. Daigle has answered the appeal.
On appeal, Mr. Daigle contends that "[t]he trial court erred as a matter of law in adding legal interest to a prior final judgment — here, the Partition Judgment of October 22, 2002 — that is silent as to that issue." In her Answer to Appeal, Ms. Daigle seeks an award of damages for frivolous appeal.
As phrased by Mr. Daigle, "the controversy stems from the trial court's award of legal interest, not on the Judgment being appealed, but a prior final judgment that was silent as to that issue. The appropriateness of the interest award is the only issue on appeal."
Mr. Daigle seeks a de novo review of the record, asserting that "[w]hen, as here, the trial court misapplies the law, the standard of appellate review is de novo review." A de novo review is the proper standard of review in a summary judgment case where there are contested issues of fact. Guillot v. Guillot, 12-109 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/6/12), 92 So.3d 1212. However, "[i]n a case where there are no contested issues of fact[] and the only issue is the application of the law to the undisputed facts, ... the proper standard of review is whether or not there has been legal error." Tyson v. King, 09-963, p. 2 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/3/10), 29 So.3d 719, 720 (quoting Bailey v. City of Lafayette, 05-29, p. 2 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/1/05), 904 So.2d 922, 923, writs denied, 05-1689, 05-1690, 05-1691, and 05-1692 (La.1/9/06), 918 So.2d 1054, 1055, and the cases cited therein). In this case, there are no facts in dispute; therefore, the proper standard of review is
The relevant portions of the October 22, 2002 Partition Judgment are as follows:
By contrast, the May 31, 2012 judgment provides, in pertinent part: "
A perusal and comparison of the foregoing judgments reveals that the May 31, 2012 judgment contains an obvious and substantial modification of the Partition Judgment by the inclusion of an award of legal interest. Neither statute nor jurisprudence allows for such a modification.
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 1951 provides that a final judgment may be amended under very limited circumstances. "A final judgment may be amended by the trial court at any time, with or without notice, on its own motion or on motion of any party: (1) To alter the phraseology of the judgment, but not the substance; or (2) To correct errors of calculation." Id. Moreover, as Mr. Daigle notes, this article "provides no authority for the trial court to amend its own final judgment to award judicial interest, let alone to amend a final judgment of another court."
A similar claim made for interest was previously disallowed by this court in Gremillion v. Gremillion, 10-05 (La.App. 3 Cir. 7/7/10), 43 So.3d 1063, writ denied, 10-2125 (La.12/10/10), 51 So.3d 726, which we find persuasive. In Gremillion, this court opined as follows:
Id. at 1066-67 (second emphasis added).
Ms. Daigle's present claim for legal interest is indistinguishable from those claims asserted in Gremillion. Ms. Daigle's claim is based upon the prior final judgment that was silent as to interest. The Partition Judgment of the 16th JDC is final, and Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 1951 only empowers that court to amend that judgment for the limited purposes set forth in the article. However, neither the 16th JDC nor any court of another jurisdiction has the authority to substantively amend the Partition Judgment to now include an award of legal interest.
Finally, in her Answer to Appeal, Ms. Daigle seeks an award of damages for frivolous appeal. However, having found merit in Mr. Daigle's appeal and having reversed the trial court's grant of partial summary judgment, we deny Ms. Daigle's claim for damages for frivolous appeal.
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the May 31, 2012 judgment of the trial court granting the motion for partial summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff, Kimberly Crittenden Daigle, and we deny Ms. Daigle's request for damages for frivolous appeal. All costs of this appeal are assessed to Kimberly Crittenden Daigle.